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INTRODUCTION 
wo related sections of the Clean Water Act have recently 
received attention in the Oregon courts—and not without 
considerable confusion.  These Clean Water Act sections allow 
certain pollutant discharges into Oregon’s waterways, and the recent 
litigation has raised questions about their application to local mining 
operations. 
Gold mining has a long history in the western United States, and 
Oregon is no exception.  Since the Gold Rush in the mid-1800s, 
prospectors have scoured the West for precious metals, laying claim 
to their “right to mine” under the General Mining Act of 1872.1  In 
recent years, recreational prospectors have begun using modern small 
suction dredges, a more accessible and lower-impact alternative to 
large dredging equipment, to search for the precious minerals on 
federal lands.2  Yet even small suction dredge mining is known to 
taint streams with toxins, disrupt wildlife habitats, and, ultimately, 
impact human health.3 
Environmentalists have opposed the practice for years.  In Oregon, 
the Northwest Environmental Defense Center has been fighting state 
regulations that permit small suction dredge mining practices since 
the state issued the regulations in 1997.4  Within the past two years, 
after California passed a statewide moratorium prohibiting the 
activity,5 small suction dredge mining on Oregon streams has become 
particularly popular,6 and its impacts particularly noteworthy. 
In 2005, under its delegated Clean Water Act authority, the Oregon 
Environmental Quality Commission (EQC) issued General Permit 
700-PM to regulate the practice of small suction dredge mining.  The 
Northwest Environmental Defense Center and other environmental 
 
1 General Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22–24, 26-28, 29, 30, 33–35, 37, 39–43, 47 
(2006). 
2 Under the General Mining Act of 1872, federal lands are generally open to mining 
exploration.  See id. § 22. 
3 Bret C. Harvey & Thomas E Lisle, Effects of Suction Dredging on Streams: A Review 
and an Evaluation Strategy, 23 FISHERIES HABITAT 8, 8 (1998). 
4 See Nw. Envtl. Found. v. Or. Dep’t of Envtl Quality, CV 9706-04970 (Or. Circ. Ct. 
4th Dist. Sept. 18, 1998). 
5 See S.B. 670, 2009 Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), available at 
http://.info.sen.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_06510700/sb_670_bill_20090227_introduced 
.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
6 See The New 49’ers, New 49’ers Discover High-grade Gold Dredging on the Rogue 
River in Southern Oregon!, http://www.goldgold.com/rogue_dredging.htm (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2011) (advertising recreational gold mining opportunities on the Rogue River). 
T
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and mining organizations challenged the permit, filing a petition for 
judicial review in the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing procedural, 
substantive, and statutory deficiencies in the suction-dredge 
permitting scheme.  In December 2009, the court issued an opinion on 
the validity—or invalidity, as it were—of the general permit.7  The 
court declared the 2005 permit invalid because its “lack of 
specificity” rendered it outside the statutory authority of the EQC.8  In 
so doing, the court also addressed the distinction between two 
mutually exclusive and often-debated sections of the Clean Water 
Act: sections 402 and 404.  This portion of the court’s opinion is, in 
many ways, problematic, because it allows for simultaneous 
regulation of small suction dredge mining by two distinct agencies, 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection 
Agency, which the Clean Water Act empowered for two very 
different purposes. 
This Note discusses the Oregon court’s decision in Northwest 
Environmental Defense Center v. Environmental Quality Commission 
(NEDC); specifically, it addresses the court’s interpretation of the 
Clean Water Act as it relates to the text and structure of the Act itself, 
the applicable precedent, and the history and purposes of the agencies 
involved.  To provide context, the Note begins by describing the 
practice of small suction dredge mining.  Part I takes both a practical 
and technical approach, attempting to distinguish the practice 
regulated under Oregon law from activities regulated elsewhere.  Part 
II addresses some of the intricacies of the Clean Water Act, providing 
the federal statutory background for the NEDC decision.  Part III 
reviews the NEDC decision in detail, including its procedural history, 
relevant precedent, and the court’s analysis.  Finally, Part IV 
discusses certain legal and practical considerations that the court 
should have addressed in the NEDC decision, such as the limited 
functions of the Act’s administering agencies and the inconsistencies 
that result from other provisions of the Act when sections 402 and 
404 are read as the Oregon Court of Appeals chose to read them.  Part 
V concludes by suggesting a different interpretation of at least the 
term “discharge” under sections 402 and 404 and by urging 
reconsideration of the court’s interpretation. 
 
7 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Envtl. Quality Comm’n, 232 Or. App. 619, 223 P.3d 1071 
(2009), review allowed, 349 Or. 56, 240 P.3d 1097 (2010), dismissed as improvidently 
granted, 349 Or. 246, 245 P.3d 130 (2010). 
8 Id. at 645, 223 P.3d at 1086. 
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I 
SMALL SUCTION DREDGE MINING 
As the Oregon Court of Appeals correctly noted in NEDC, small 
suction dredge mining is a subset of “placer mining,” a type of mining 
that extracts valuable minerals from sediment deposits known as 
placers.9  But to what extent do small suction dredges vary from other 
placer mines, and do such distinctions matter?  This Part considers 
that question. 
A.  Placer Mining 
Placer mining is a broad practice.  Placers, or deposits of detrital or 
indurated sediment10 containing concentrations of precious minerals, 
collect in streams, on hillsides, on beaches, or in other generally 
offshore areas.11  Placers can be formed by chemical weathering, 
wind, streamflows, or other natural processes.12  In-stream placers are 
often the most valuable, yielding high concentrations of precious 
metals, and are generally more common than placers in other 
environments.13  Gold has historically been among the most valuable 
placer minerals—simply based on its utility—but other minerals, 
including diamond, tin, and platinum, are also heavily mined. 
In large mining operations, placer mining for these minerals can be 
performed using bucket scrapers, which cut pits at depths of thirty 
feet and involve substantial surface water diversion mechanisms.14  
One could also mine placers using cutterhead hydraulic dredges, 
which dig to depths of fifty feet and use large motors operating at up 
to 10,000 horsepower.15  At the other end of the spectrum, placer 
mining could also be performed by simple hand panning, a low-
impact method of mining practiced for hundreds of years.16  
Somewhere in between these two extremes are large and small 
suction dredges, which operate by suctioning the minerals from the 
streambed and redepositing the mineral waste after processing.17 
 
9 See ARTHUR B. CUMMINS & IVAN A. GIVEN, SOCIETY OF MINING ENGINEERS OF 
AIME, MINING ENGINEERING HANDBOOK 17-151 (1973) (so describing the practice). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 17-151–52. 
12 Id. at 17-152. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 17-161. 
15 Id. at 17-164. 
16 Id. at 17-161. 
17 Id. at 17-163–64. 
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B.  Suction Dredging in Oregon 
The State of Oregon—in particular, the Oregon Department of 
Environmental Quality and the Department of State Lands—has 
regulated small-scale dredge mining activities throughout the state 
since the early 1990s.18  The state also regulates large-scale mining 
activities, although it generally prohibits such activities in state scenic 
waterways and Essential Salmon Habitat (ESH), subjecting large 
mining activities in these areas to more extensive permitting 
requirements than small-scale mining.  In 1997, small suction dredge 
mining activities became the subject of a General Permit—the 700-J 
permit—the requirements of which are significantly less stringent 
than a permit for the large-scale alternative. 
The activity regulated under the 700-J permit—now the 700-PM 
permit19—is much different than the large placer mining activities 
that were and still are common on many major waterways in other 
parts of the United States.  In fact, small suction dredging is more 
similar, at least with respect to the magnitude of its impact, to hand 
panning than it is to large placer mining: with small suction dredging, 
the streambed volume disturbed is relatively limited, as is the 
ancillary effect on sediment upstream and downstream of the mining 
location.  Under Oregon law, small suction dredge mining is 
permitted in areas of Essential Salmon Habitat, subject to limitations 
on the volume of streambed disturbed by the activity, the diameter of 
the intake nozzle, and the size of the motor.20 
C.  Environmental Considerations 
Suction dredging is harmful to fish habitat, especially spawning 
beds in and along the streams and waterways in which it occurs.  And 
one can see why: a suction dredge essentially sucks up sediment from 
the streambed, runs it through a small sluice box, and redeposits the 
material—or what remains of the material—back into the stream as a 
suspended solid. 
 
18 OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, 700-PM GENERAL PERMIT FACT SHEET 3–4 (July 
30, 2010) (describing the history Oregon’s regulation of the practice under the section 
entitled “Permit History”). 
19 Id. at 1. 
20 OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, 700-PM GENERAL DISCHARGE PERMIT 7 (reissued 
July 30, 2010) (codified by reference in OR. ADMIN. R. 340-045-0033(11)). 
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This practice materially alters the streambed itself and increases the 
water’s turbidity level,21 extending the sediment mobility by casting it 
downstream and ultimately disrupting spawning gravels.22  The 
excavation from suction dredging compounds the instability of the 
streambed, creating material alterations and increased local scour in 
areas where fish often spawn.23  Dredge tailings are attractive to 
salmonids for spawning sites, and they ultimately increase the 
mortality rate for aquatic organisms and dramatically decrease the 
salmon population.24  It seems generally undisputed that dredging 
activities, particularly in areas of Essential Salmon Habitat and during 
spawning season, are harmful to the environment. 
II 
STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF NEDC 
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act,25 more commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (the 
“Act”), with the express purpose of “[r]estor[ing] and maintain[ing] 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”26  The Act codified at least two national goals: (1) to 
eliminate “the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters [of the 
United States] . . . by 1985,” and (2) to “provide[] for the protection 
and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provide[] for 
recreation in and on the water [to] be achieved by . . . 1983.”27  To 
achieve those goals, Congress forcefully mandated that, “[e]xcept as 
in compliance with this section and sections . . . 1342, and 1344 of 
this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be 
unlawful.”28  Sections 1342 and 1344, which are more commonly 
referred to by their Public Law section numbers—402 and 404, 
 
21 Turbidity is a measurement of water clarity or “light scatter”—the ability of water to 
scatter light—measured in Nephelometric Turbity Units (NTUs).  ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, 
Importance of Turbidity, in EPA GUIDANCE MANUAL 7.1, 7.4 (1999).  Turbidity, in effect, 
measures the presence of suspended solids in water.  See id.  Although the question was 
not at issue in NEDC, turbidity, itself, is not a “pollutant,” but an indicator thereof. 
22 Harvey & Lisle, supra note 3, at 11. 
23 Adrienne DelCotto, Comment, Suction Drudge Mining: The United States Forest 
Service Hands Miners the Golden Ticket, 40 ENVTL. L. 1021, 1026 (2010). 
24 Id. 
25 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 
(2006). 
26 Id. § 1251(a). 
27 Id. §§ 1251(a)(1)–(2). 
28 Id. § 1311(a). 
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respectively—set forth two exceptions to this broad prohibition on the 
discharge of pollutants into waters governed by the Act.29 
The first of the two exceptions, section 402, establishes the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, or the NPDES.  
The NPDES statutory scheme allows the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to issue permits for the 
discharge of pollutants so long as the discharge complies with certain 
effluent limitations established under the Act.30  Section 402 also 
authorizes the states to establish statewide permitting programs 
pursuant to the NPDES, as long as those programs also meet the Act’s 
established standards.31  The EPA has authorized most states, 
including Oregon, to administer its own NPDES permitting.32  In 
Oregon, the authority to issue NPDES permits belongs to the Oregon 
Environmental Quality Commission.33 
Section 404 functions as another distinct exception to the Act’s 
general prohibition on discharges.  By the language of the Act, it is 
also an exception to the NPDES permitting requirement: “Except as 
provided in section[] . . . 404 of this Act, the Administer may . . . 
issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, [subject to 
authorized NPDES state guidelines].”34  Section 404 authorizes the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers35 to issue permits for “the discharge of 
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal 
sites.”36  This division of permitting authority is critical: the mission 
 
29 The Clean Water Act generally governs discharges into “navigable waters.”  The Act 
defines “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,” § 
1362(7), which the EPA has further interpreted to include “[a]ll other waters such as 
intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams) . . . [w]hich are or could be 
used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes,” 40 C.F.R. § 
122.2 (2003).  Federal courts have upheld this definition, although it has been 
controversial.  See THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 323–25 
(2008) (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006)). 
30 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). 
31 Id. § 1342(b); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.5 (2010) (providing for review of state 
standards).  In other words, a state may opt to establish its own standards, so long as its 
standards are at least as stringent, if not more, than the federal standards. 
32 At this time, the EPA has granted forty-six states the authority to administer the 
NPDES permitting program.  SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 327; see also U.S.  
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA State Program Status, http://cfpub.epa 
.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
33 See OR. REV. STAT. § 468B.035(1) (2009). 
34 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). 
35 Section 404 authorizes the “Secretary” to issue permits, referring to the “Secretary of 
the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers.”  33 U.S.C. § 1344(d). 
36 Id. § 1344(a). 
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of the EPA—“to protect human health and the environment”37—is far 
different than that of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the 
“Corps”).  The mission of the Corps contemplates construction and 
navigation; indeed, the Corps says that it “[p]rovide[s] vital 
engineering services . . . to strengthen our Nation’s security, energize 
the economy, and reduce risks from disasters.”38 
It is, however, important to note that under section 404, the Act 
provides an avenue by which the EPA can “veto” a discharge at a 
specified disposal site under section 404(a).39  Under section 404(c), 
if the EPA Administrator decides that a discharge permitted under 
section 404(a) will result in an “unacceptable adverse effect on [the 
environment],” the Administrator can exercise what amounts to veto 
power and bring the discharge back within the section 402 permitting 
scheme.40 
III 
THE NEDC DECISION 
In 2009, the Oregon Court of Appeals was presented with the 
opportunity to clarify exactly where small suction dredge mining falls 
under the Clean Water Act’s complex statutory scheme.41  Petitioner 
Eastern Oregon Mining Association argued that a general permit by 
the Oregon EQC fell outside the statutory scope of that agency, while 
petitioner Northwest Environmental Defense Center argued the 
opposite, noting, however, that the permit was invalid on other 
grounds.42  The court essentially dismissed all of the arguments, 
declaring the permit invalid because of its purported “lack of 
specificity.”43 
 
37 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Our Mission and What We Do, 
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa /whatwedo.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
38 See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mission & Vision, http://www.usace 
.army.mil/about/Pages /Mission.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
39 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). 
40 Id. 
41 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Envtl. Quality Comm’n, 232 Or. App. 619, 223 P.3d 1071 
(2009), review allowed, 349 Or. 56, 240 P.3d 1097 (2010), dismissed as improvidently 
granted, 349 Or. 246, 245 P.3d 130 (2010). 
42 Id. at 643, 223 P.3d at 1084. 
43 Id. at 645, 223 P.3d at 1086. 
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A.  The History 
In 1997, the Oregon EQC began regulating small suction dredge 
mining under a general permit issued pursuant to its delegated 
authority under section 402.44  This permit, known as the 700-J 
permit, was the predecessor to the permit at issue in the NEDC 
decision and expired by its own terms in 2002.45  In 2005, the EQC 
issued the general discharge permit known as the 700-PM permit, 
which functioned to replace the 700-J permit.46  The 700-PM permit 
was the subject of the NEDC litigation.47 
The scope of the 700-PM permit extended to “suction dredges not 
to exceed 30 horsepower with an inside diameter suction hose no 
greater than 6 inches that are used for recovering precious metals or 
minerals from stream bottom sediments.”48  The permit established 
discharge limitations for small suction dredges falling within its 
scope, providing that “‘no wastes may be discharged . . . that will 
violate . . . OAR Chapter 340, Division 41.’”49 
In turn, division 41 includes a comprehensive set of water quality 
limitations, including turbidity standards.50  Specifically, OAR 340-
041-0036 provides that “[n]o more than a ten percent cumulative 
increase in natural stream turbidities may be allowed, as measured 
relative to a control point immediately upstream of the turbidity 
causing activity.”51  The 700-PM permit, however, distinguishing 
between “background turbidity” and “visible turbidity,” exempted 
certain suction dredge sizes: “Suction dredges with suction hoses that 
have an inside diameter of 4 inches or greater must not create visible 
turbidity beyond 300 feet downstream from a working dredge.”52  On 
the other hand, “single operating suction dredge[s] equipped with a 
suction hose with an inside diameter less than 4 inches has no 
 
44 Id. at 623, 223 P.3d at 1074.  Section 402 authorizes the issuance of general permits 
under section 1342(b)(1). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 622, 223 P.3d at 1073. 
47 See Memorandum from Larry Knudsen, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen., to Annette 
Liebe, Surface Water Manager, Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (Aug. 3, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
48 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 624, 223 P.3d at 1074 (quoting the language of 
the 2005 700-PM Permit). 
49 Id. (alteration omitted). 
50 See generally OR. ADMIN. R. § 340-041. 
51 Id. § 340-041-0036. 
52 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 624, 223 P.3d at 1074. 
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turbidity discharge limitation.”53  Oregon’s water quality standards 
provide an exception to the turbidity standard that is applicable to 
“[d]redging, [c]onstruction, or other [l]egitimate [a]ctivities” 
authorized pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act, but not 
section 402.54 
The Northwest Environmental Defense Council (NEDC) and the 
Eastern Oregon Mining Association (EOMA) both filed petitions for 
judicial review of the general permit, but on different grounds.55  
NEDC argued its case on both procedural and substantive grounds: it 
contended that the EQC did not follow the applicable rulemaking 
procedures and that the EQC did not provide sufficient notice to the 
public that it intended to exempt small suction dredges from the 
turbidity requirements.56  NEDC also argued that, in providing such 
an exemption, the EQC violated the notice requirements of the 
Oregon Administrative Procedure Act.57  Finally, NEDC argued that 
the substance of the permit—in other words, the exemption itself—
was inconsistent with Oregon’s water quality standards.58 
The EOMA, for its part, argued that the EQC exceeded its statutory 
authority by promulgating the general permit because small suction 
dredge mining is properly regulated under section 404, not section 
402.59  According to the EOMA, such regulation belongs under the 
authority of the Corps, not the authority of the states pursuant to the 
NPDES.60 
Because the EOMA’s argument was dispositive, the Oregon Court 
of Appeals considered that argument first.61  The court first identified 
 
53 Id., 223 P.3d at 1074–75 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
54 OR. ADMIN. R. § 340-041-0036(2). 
55 See Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 625, 223 P.3d at 1075.  Both petitions were 
filed pursuant to Oregon Administrative Procedures Act, which allows “a petition by any 
person to the Court of Appeals” to determine the validity of any rule.  OR. REV. STAT. § 
183.400(1) (2007).  Under the Act, the Court of Appeals’ review is henceforth limited to 
examination of: “(a) [t]he rule under review; (b) [t]he statutory provisions authorizing the 
rule; and (c)[c]opies of all documents necessary to demonstrate compliance with 
applicable rulemaking procedures.”  Id. § 183.400(3). 
56 Opening Brief for Petitioner at 24, 41, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Envtl. Quality 
Comm’n, 232 Or. App. 619 (2009) (No. A 712) (2007 WL 7131913). 
57 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 625, 223 P.3d at 1075. 
58 Opening Brief for Petitioner, supra note 56, at 41. 
59 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 625, 223 P.3d at 1075. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  Under the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act, the court must declare a rule 
invalid if the court finds that the rule “[e]xceeds the statutory authority of the agency.”  
OR. REV. STAT. § 183.400(4)(b). 
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the methodology it would use to address the question presented.  That 
question seems straightforward on its face: Which portion of the 
Clean Water Act—section 402 or section 404—governs small suction 
dredge mining?  Underlying that question, however, is a much more 
fundamental, yet historically unclear, issue: How are sections 402 and 
404 intended to operate, and what is the difference between the 
“discharge of pollutants” under section 402 and the “discharge of 
dredged or fill material” under section 404? 
And so the Court of Appeals began a long and complex review of 
the statutory and regulatory fields encompassing section 402 and 
section 404 permits.62  The court’s analysis ultimately turned on the 
meaning of the phrase “dredged material” under section 40463 and at 
various points identified regulatory history indicating, in the court’s 
view, that the material discharged by small suction dredges could fall 
under either of the two Clean Water Act permitting schemes.  The 
court concluded not only that “small suction dredge mining . . . 
involves the placement of dredged spoil and mining tailings . . . 
regulated exclusively by the Corps under section 404, and not the 
EPA,”64 but also found that “small suction dredge mining involves     
. . . discharges of turbid wastewater that are permitted by the EPA.”65  
These conclusions, taken together, are inconsonant with the meaning 
of the Clean Water Act.  In declaring the 700-PM permit invalid,66 
the court muddied the waters of Clean Water Act permitting and, in 
doing so, rendered an interpretation of the Act that is, in many ways, 
altogether inconsistent with the latest opinion of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.67 
B.  The Precedent: Coeur Alaska 
After oral arguments in NEDC, but before the Oregon Court of 
Appeals rendered its decision in December 2009, the U.S. Supreme 
Court announced its latest interpretation of the Clean Water Act’s 
dual permitting scheme.68  In Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska 
Conservation Council, the Court was called upon to determine, 
among other questions, whether the discharge of mining waste, or 
 
62 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 627–45, 223 P.3d at 1077–85. 
63 Id. at 630, 223 P.3d at 1077–78. 
64 Id. at 643–44, 223 P.3d at 1085. 
65 Id. at 645, 223 P.3d at 1086. 
66 Id. at 645, 223 P.3d at 1085. 
67 See Coeur Alaska v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S.Ct. 2458 (2009). 
68 See id. 
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slurry, into an existing lake constituted “discharge of . . . fill material” 
subject to section 404, or whether that discharge constituted 
“discharge of pollutants” subject to section 402.69  In essence, the 
Court was faced with a similar question of federal statutory 
interpretation: Does the Clean Water Act “give[] authority to the 
[Corps], or instead to the [EPA], to issue a permit for the discharge of 
mining waste[?]”70 
The facts in Coeur Alaska are important in understanding the 
Court’s analysis of the statutory scheme.  The large-scale mining 
operation at issue in that case had two distinct discharge locations, 
one from the mine into the lake and a second from the lake into the 
downstream waterway.71  The Court was careful to draw the 
distinction between the two discharges.  It noted, “The EPA also 
issued a permit of its own—not for the discharge from the mine into 
the lake but for the discharge from the lake into the downstream 
creek.”72  Each location, according to the Court’s opinion, appears to 
be a separate “discharge” in determining the applicable permit. 
In the end, the Court concluded that where one agency had 
authority to permit a discharge, the other did not.  The Court noted, 
“The Act is best understood to provide that if the Corps has authority 
to issue a permit for a discharge under section 404, then the EPA 
lacks authority to do so under section 402.”73  Although the opinion 
of the Court was joined in full by only five Justices,74 all nine agreed 
on the proposition that sections 402 and 404 are, effectively, mutually 
exclusive.75 
With respect to the proposed mining operation, the Court 
concluded that the EPA’s decision to treat discharge directly into the 
 
69 Id. at 2463.  Although the discharge at issue in Coeur Alaska was, if subject to 
section 404, undisputedly “fill material” rather than “dredged material,” that distinction 
does not change the Court’s analysis of the permitting scheme or its application to the 
NEDC decision. 
70 Id. 
71 See id. at 2464. 
72 Id. at 2465. 
73 Id. at 2467. 
74 Id. at 2462.  The opinion of the Court, announced by Justice Kennedy, was joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, and Alito.  Justice Breyer wrote 
separately, concurring.  Justice Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part.  Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented. 
75 Id. at 2477. (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he law authorizes the environmental 
agencies to classify material as one or the other.”); id. at 2482 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“All agree on preliminary matters.  Only one agency, the Corps or EPA, can issue a 
permit for the discharge.”). 
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lake as “fill material” subject to section 404, and spillover from the 
lake to the downstream waterway as “pollutants” subject to section 
402, was reasonable.76  In fact, the Court found the Clean Water Act 
to be clear: “The regulatory scheme discloses a defined, and 
workable, line for determining whether the Corps or the EPA has the 
permit authority.”77  In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit, 
according to the Court, “in effect reallocated the division of 
responsibility that the Corps and the EPA had been following,”78 by 
finding that “‘both . . . appear to apply in this case.’”79 
C.  The Court’s Analysis 
What is interesting about the Oregon Court of Appeals’ decision in 
NEDC is that it very explicitly recognized that the Supreme Court, in 
Coeur Alaska, interpreted sections 402 and 404 to be mutually 
exclusive,80 yet the opinion goes on to, for all practical purposes, 
undermine the reasoning behind that interpretation.  The Oregon court 
began where it rightfully should have, by identifying the phrase 
“discharge of dredged material” in section 404 to be at issue.  After 
reporting the “ordinary meaning” of the phrase “dredged material” 
(but not that of the term “discharge”), the court found the statute to be 
ambiguous.  Because the statute is ambiguous—in other words, 
because Congress had not “directly spoken” to the issue—the court 
turned to the regulatory history of the EPA and the Corps to 
determine its meaning.81 
The regulatory history behind the phrase “discharge of dredged 
materials” is, admittedly, complex.  The court started with the 
agencies’ definition of the phrase “discharge of dredged material” as 
it existed at the time the 700-PM permit was issued: 
 
76 Id. at 2463, 2478 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
77 Id. at 2469. 
78 Id. at 2467. 
79 Id. at 2466 (quoting Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. United States Army Corps of 
Engs., 486 F.3d 638, 644 (2007) (alteration omitted)). 
80 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Envtl. Quality Comm’n, 232 Or. App. 619, 223 P.3d 1071 
(2009), review allowed, 349 Or. 56, 240 P.3d 1097 (2010), dismissed as improvidently 
granted, 349 Or. 246, 245 P.3d 130 (2010). 
81 Id. at 630–31, 223 P.3d at 1078.  The court cites Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), where the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that, where a court reviews an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers, the court 
must first assess “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”  
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842.  “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous,” directed 
the Court, the reviewing court should defer to the agency’s interpretation if it “is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute.”  Id. at 843. 
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(d)(1) Except as provided below in paragraph (d)(3), the term 
discharge of dredged material means any addition of dredged 
material into, including redeposit of dredged material other than 
incidental fallback within, the waters of the United States.  The term 
includes, but is not limited to the following: 
(i) The addition of dredged material to a specified discharge 
site located in waters of the United States; 
. . . . 
(iii) Any addition, including redeposit other than incidental 
fallback, of dredged material, including excavated material, 
into waters of the United States which is incidental to any 
activity, including mechanized landclearing, ditching, 
channelization, or other excavation. 
(2)(i) The Corps and EPA regard the use of mechanized earth-
moving equipment to conduct landclearing, ditching, 
channelization, in-stream mining or other earth-moving activity 
in waters of the United States as resulting in a discharge of 
dredged material unless project-specific evidence shows that 
the activity results in only incidental fallback. . . . 
(ii) Incidental fallback is the redeposit of small volumes of 
dredged material that is incidental to excavation activity in 
waters of the United States when such material falls back to 
substantially the same place as the initial removal. . . . 
(3) The term discharge of dredged material does not include the 
following: 
(i) Discharges of pollutants into waters of the United States 
resulting from onshore subsequent processing of dredged 
material that is extracted for any commercial use (other than 
fill).  These discharges are subject to section 402 of the Clean 
Water Act even though the extraction and deposit of such 
material may require a permit from the Corps or applicable 
State section 404 program. 
. . . . 
(iii) Incidental fallback.82 
At that point, the court jumped back in time, explaining the 
regulatory history leading up to the 2005 definition of “dredged 
material.”83  Starting with a decision from 1993, the court considered 
the Tulloch Rule, which defined the phrase “discharge of dredged 
material” to include “any addition, including any redeposit, of 
dredged material, including excavated material, into waters of the 
 
82 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2001) (emphasis added); see also 40 C.F.R. § 323.2 (similarly 
defining the term “discharge of dredged material”). 
83 Nw Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 632–33, 223 P.3d at 1080. 
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United States which is incidental to any activity, including 
mechanized landclearing, ditching, channelization, or other 
excavation.”84  The Tulloch Rule did not exempt “incidental fallback” 
from section 404 regulation.85  When the rule was promulgated, the 
court noted, the EPA and the Corps made the following statement 
about the Tulloch Rule’s impact on current agency practice: 
 [I]t is important to realize that the Corps has been regulating 
many projects involving mechanized landclearing, ditching, 
channelization, mining, or other excavation in waters of the U.S. for 
years because those projects frequently involved substantial 
discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the U.S. 
. . . . 
 Nevertheless, this final rule does represent both a clarification of 
agency guidance and a change of agency practice regarding a sub-
class of excavation-type activities in waters of the U.S.: i.e., those 
that would take place with relative small-volume, “incidental” 
discharges of dredged material that unavoidably accompany such 
excavation operations.86 
The court then considered a 1998 D.C. Circuit case, which 
invalidated the Tulloch Rule on the grounds that, to the extent that it 
purported to subject “incidental fallback” to section 404 regulation, it 
was outside the scope of the Corps’ statutory authority.87  In response, 
and as the court discussed, the Corps and the EPA issued a new rule, 
commonly referred to as Tulloch II, which provided an exception to 
the previous definition of “discharge of dredged material” where 
“project-specific evidence shows that the activity results in only 
incidental fallback.”88 
The court noted, specifically, that Tulloch II did not remove, but in 
fact added to, the language in 33 C.F.R. section 232.2 that declares, 
 
84 Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008-01, 45035, 45037 (Aug. 
25, 1993).  The Tulloch Rule gets its name from the fact that the rule resulted from a 
settlement agreement in North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Tulloch, Civil No. C90-
713-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C. 1992).  See 58 Fed. Fed. Reg. at 45008. 
85 See id. 
86 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 633, 223 P.3d at 1080; 58 Fed. Reg. at 45013. 
87 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 634, 223 P.3d at 1079; see also Nat’l Mining 
Ass’n v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(holding the same).  The court in National Mining Ass’n reasoned that the term “addition” 
in section 404 “cannot reasonably be said to encompass the situation in which material is 
removed from the waters of the United States and a small portion of it happens to fall 
back.”  Id. at 1404. 
88 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 634, 223 P.3d at 1080; see Further Revisions to 
the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Discharge of Dredged Material, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 4550-01 (Jan. 17, 2001). 
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“The Corps and EPA regard the use of mechanized earth-moving 
equipment to conduct landclearing, ditching, channelization, 
instream-mining or other earth-moving activity in waters of the 
United States as resulting in a discharge of dredged material.”89  The 
court emphasized the agencies’ response to public comment in 
Tulloch II that stated, 
We acknowledge that some suction dredging operations can be 
conducted in such a manner that if the excavated material is 
pumped to an upland location or other container outside waters of 
the U.S. and the mechanized removal activity takes place without 
re-suspending and relocating sediment downstream, then such 
operations generally would not be regulated.90 
The court takes this statement to draw an inference that, at most, is a 
non sequitur: “[S]uction dredging operations are regulated under 
section 404 if the ‘excavated material’ is not pumped to land . . . and 
where the removal activity does resuspend or relocate sediment 
downstream.”91  The court, after all of this, drew the preliminary 
conclusion that the agencies understood “in-stream mining” and, in 
particular, suction dredging, to be regulable under section 404.92  But 
its analysis did not stop there. 
The court then proceeded to review other instances where the EPA, 
the Corps, and other courts indicated that the EPA, not the Corps, 
regulates discharges from placer mines.  It first discussed a 1986 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the EPA and the Corps, 
addressing discharges of solid wastes into waters of the United 
States.93  That MOA specifically addressed “placer mining wastes,” 
noting that such wastes constitute pollutants subject to EPA 
regulation under section 402, not Corps regulation under section 
404.94  Next, the court turned to a Regulatory Guidance Letter issued 
 
89 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 634–35, 223 P.3d at 1080 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 
323.2(d)(2)). 
90 Id. at 635, 223 P.3d at 1080 (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. at 4554).  Tulloch II was later 
invalidated, and the agencies restored the rule to the 1999 version.  Id. at 636, 223 P.3d at 
1081 n.10; see also Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Discharge 
of Dredged Material”; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 79641-01 (Dec. 30, 2008).  That said, the 
reasoning behind the action taken in 73 Fed. Reg. 79641-01 is unrelated to the issue 
presented here, and it does not appear as if that action changed the agencies’ interpretation 
of section 404 as it relates to in-stream mining. 
91 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 635, 223 P.3d at 1080. 
92 Id. at 636, 223 P.3d at 1080. 
93 Id. at 637, 223 P.3d at 1081. 
94 Memorandum of Agreement on Solid Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 8871 (Mar. 14, 1986). 
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by the Corps that further classified placer-mining waste as a material 
regulable under section 402.95 
Finally, the court landed on a series of regulatory and judicial 
determinations made by the EPA and the Ninth Circuit with respect to 
placer-mining operations in Alaska.96  The most noteworthy of these 
determinations came with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rybachek v. 
United States, in which the Ninth Circuit upheld EPA-established 
effluent limitations of placer-mining operations in Alaska, pursuant to 
the EPA’s authority under section 402.97  Following Rybachek, the 
court noted, the EPA in Alaska relied on the Ninth Circuit’s analysis a 
number of times, explicitly rejecting arguments that small suction 
dredge mining was outside the scope of EPA authority.98 
Then, the court reached yet another intermediate conclusion: “If 
that were the sum of the regulatory history . . . we might conclude that 
discharges from small suction dredge mining are regulated 
exclusively under section 402.”99  But, yet again, it continued its 
analysis.  The court finally addressed a series of public notices issued 
by the Corps, where the Corps first explained its reasoning for not 
regulating small suction dredge mining and then switched course by 
issuing a general permit regulating Alaskan suction dredge 
operations.100 
After all of that, the Oregon Court of Appeals arrived at a 
conclusion that is, at best, convenient.  According to the court, not 
only does small suction dredge mining involve “placement of dredged 
spoil . . . that . . . constitutes the ‘discharge of dredged material.’. . . 
 
95 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 637–38, 223 P.3d at 1082 (citing U.S. Army 
Corp of Engineers, Regulatory Guidance Letter 88-10 (July 28, 1990)).  The court notes 
that the Regulatory Guidance Letter expired by its own terms on December 31, 1990; it 
asserted, however, that despite this, the letter still served as evidence that there is a 
meaningful distinction, according to the agencies, between mining waste and dredged 
material.  Id. at 638, 223 P.3d at 1082. 
96 Id. at 638–42, 223 P.3d at 1082–84. 
97 Rybachek v. United States, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990). 
98 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 232 Or. App. at 640–41, 223 P.3d at 1083–84 (citing, for 
example, Response to Comments Regarding Reissuance of General NPDES Permit (G.P.) 
for Alaskan Small Suction Dredging (Permit Number AKG-37-5000) (2007), incorporated 
by reference at 72 Fed. Reg. 20847, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District 
Regulatory Branch, Special Public Notice 001-08 (Aug. 16, 2001)). 
99 Id. at 641, 223 P.3d at 1083. 
100 Id. at 641–42, 223 P.3d at 1083–84 (citing U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska 
District Regulatory Division, Special Public Notice 94-10 (Sept. 13, 1994); U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, Alaska District Regulatory Division, Public Notice 007-372 (July 3, 
2007)). 
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regulated exclusively by the Corps under section 404,”101 but it also 
involves “discharges of turbid wastewater that are permitted by the 
EPA.”102  This conclusion raises the question, how is that possible? 
IV 
PRACTICAL [RE]CONSIDERATIONS 
The practical implications of NEDC are monumental.  Premised on 
its conclusions, the EPA and the Corps could both simultaneously 
regulate small suction dredge mining.  The Oregon Court of Appeals 
seemed to take no account of the broader purposes behind the 
distinction between section 402 and section 404, the meaning of the 
term “discharge” as it has applied in most other cases, or the basis for 
its conclusion within the broader, more complex statutory framework 
of the Clean Water Act.  The conclusion is problematic, and the 
Oregon courts should reconsider it. 
A.  The Agencies Involved 
There is evidently some reason that Congress provided the EPA 
with authority to regulate pollutants and the Corps the authority to 
regulate dredged and fill material.  What that reason is, however, 
appears to have been lost in translation, as courts struggle to derive 
meaning from the Act’s terms and structure but do not look back to 
the origins of these two agencies. 
The EPA, established by President Nixon in December 1970, was 
formed with the express purpose of dealing with the country’s 
imminent environmental pollution problem.103  In the face of 
increasing pollution and degradation of the nation’s land, air, and 
water, the country was searching for solution.104  The Nixon 
 
101 Id. at 643–44, 223 P.3d at 1085. 
102 Id. at 645, 223 P.3d at 1086. 
103 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, Special Message from the President to the 
Congress About Reorganization Plans to Establish the Environmental Protection Agency 
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (July 9, 1970), available at 
www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/org/origins/reorg.html. 
104 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Birth of the EPA (Nov. 1985), 
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/epa/15c.htm.  The piece describes the state of the nation 
and the world: 
In May 1969, U Thant of the United Nations gave the planet only ten years to 
avert environmental disaster; the following month, he blamed the bulk of 
planetary catastrophe on the United States.  Under Secretary of the Interior 
Russell E. Train spoke skeptically . . . : “If environmental deterioration is 
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Administration’s answer was to combine a series of disconnected, 
environmentally focused federal programs into one agency that could 
formulate a coordinated response to the dilemma.105  The EPA was 
thus established and empowered to conduct research and monitoring 
programs, establish standards and policies in area of environmental 
pollution and protection, and enforce those standards in concert with 
the states.106 
The Corps, on the other hand, has its origins in engineering, 
construction, and navigation.  The Corps was established as a branch 
of the Army in March 1802, and has been the lead agency in 
construction of military fortifications and transportation 
infrastructure, disaster response, and flood control.  Starting in the 
late-nineteenth century and lasting through Roosevelt’s New Deal, the 
Corps was the primary agency that performed design and construction 
services for hydropower and flood-control projects throughout the 
nation. 
In recent years, and through various Acts of Congress—in 
particular, through section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act—the Corps now works on various 
projects in the environmental context.  That said, the extent of the 
Corps’ authority in such contexts is “a natural product of historical 
evolution,” and is, thus, limited.107  Courts today have recognized this 
limitation and construe Corps authority in light of its history and 
purpose.108 
It is with this understanding in mind that one must read the 
language of the Clean Water Act.  The Act prohibits discharges of 
pollutants, as a general matter, into the nation’s navigable waters.  
The authority of the Corps, then, as the lead agency in construction 
and navigation, is undoubtedly implicated in a significant way, and 
 
permitted to continue and increase at present rates, [man] wouldn’t stand a 
snowball’s chance in hell [of surviving].” 
Id. (modifications in original). 
105 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, Special Message from the President to the 
Congress About Reorganization Plans to Establish the Environmental Protection Agency 
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (July 9, 1970), available at 
www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/org/origins/reorg.html. 
106 Id. 
107 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, A Brief History, http://www.usace.army.mil 
/History/Documents/Brief/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
108 See, e.g., Coeur Alaska v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S.Ct. 2458, 2482 
(2009) (“Section 404 hews to the Corps’ established expertise in matters of navigability 
and construction.” (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).  
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Congress was faced with the task of addressing our nation’s pollution 
crisis without adversely affecting the work of the executive in areas of 
vast importance, including the military, public safety, and economic 
development.  Congress itself recognized this authority in the Senate 
floor debates surrounding the language of section 404: “[This section] 
simply retains the authority of the Secretary of the Army to issue 
permits for the disposal of dredged materials.  This is essential since 
the Secretary of the Army is responsible for maintaining and 
improving the navigable waters of the United States.”109  Throughout 
the debates, Congress went on to address the Corps’ responsibility in 
the construction of diked disposal areas in the Great Lakes, navigation 
projects in the remaining ports and harbors of the United States, and 
other projects necessarily implicating foreign and domestic 
commerce.110  To say that recreational gold mining belongs among 
these activities seems far-fetched, at best. 
B.  A Single Discharge 
The Oregon Court of Appeals focused—as it should have, at least 
in part—on the phrase “dredged material,” and whether the discharge 
of such material is more properly regulated under section 402 or 
section 404.111  The court seemed, however, to take for granted the 
meaning of the term “discharge” as it relates to dredged material or 
other pollutants prohibited by the Act.  In the end, it held that one 
single discharge could be regulated under both sections 402 and 404. 
Under the Act, the phrase “discharge of a pollutant” means “any 
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”  
The EPA’s section 402 implementing regulations further define 
“[d]ischarge of a pollutant” as “(a) [a]ny addition of any ‘pollutant’ or 
combination of pollutants to ‘waters of the United States’ from any 
‘point source.’”112  In all cases, the term “discharge,” standing alone, 
therefore, turns on the meaning of the term “addition,” which courts 
 
109 92 Cong. Rec. 38,853 (1971) (statement of Mr. Ellender). 
110 Id. 
111 See supra Part III. 
112 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2009) (emphasis added). Regulations promulgated by the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA under section 404 do not define the term 
“discharge,” but appear to equate it to the term “addition.”  See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2010) 
(defining “discharge of dredged material” as “the addition of dredged material,” and 
“discharge of fill material” as “the addition of fill material.”); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2010) 
(same). 
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have interpreted broadly.113  As a general matter, however, it seems 
that a “discharge of a pollutant,” whatever the pollutant type, would 
include the discharge of multiple pollutants from a single point 
source. In such a case, the discharge of multiple pollutants would still 
be considered one “discharge” under the Act.  Put differently, a single 
“discharge,” regulated under either section 402 or section 404, could 
release multiple pollutants into the stream. 
As a practical matter, this would necessarily mean that a suction 
dredge, consisting of one discharge (the opening at the end of the 
sluice box), would either be a discharge regulable under section 402 
or a discharge regulable under section 404, but not both.  To say, as 
the Oregon Court of Appeals did, that a small suction dredge consists 
of both a discharge of turbid wastewater regulable under section 402 
and a discharge of mining tailings regulable under section 404 
misreads the wording of the Clean Water Act. 
The ordinary meaning of the terms “discharge” and “addition” also 
support this interpretation.  “Discharge,” as a noun, is defined as “a 
flowing or issuing out” or “a rate of flow.”114  When used as a verb, 
the term “discharge” means, “to give outlet to” or “pour forth.”115  
The word “addition” generally means, “the result of adding” or 
“anything added.”116  All of these definitions are broad and, when 
applied to an activity like small-suction dredge mining, make it 
unreasonable to interpret the single outlet from the mine’s sluice box 
as anything but one single discharge.  The definitions further preclude 
one from parsing a single discharge into multiple discharges based on 
its material composition. 
Again, the Oregon Court of Appeals’ conclusion that “small 
suction dredge mining involves discharges of dredged material . . . 
and discharges of turbid wastewater,” each regulable under separate 
permitting schemes, is simply incorrect.  That the court decided the 
issue because the 700-PM permit did not identify the “particular 
discharge” at issue opens every discharge—of pollutants, dredged 
material, or fill material—to regulation by any and all Clean Water 
Act permitting regimes.  This, as the U.S. Supreme Court announced 
in Coeur Alaska, simply cannot be the case. 
 
113 SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 320; see also Rybachek v. United States, 904 F.2d 
1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[R]esuspension may be interpreted to be an addition of a 
pollutant under the Act.”). 
114 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 644 (3d ed. 1961). 
115 Id. at 644. 
116 Id. at 24. 
DAHAB 10/28/2011  10:30 AM 
356 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 335 
C.  The Structure of the Clean Water Act 
As discussed above, the section 402 and section 404 permitting 
schemes set forth under the Act are exceptions to the Act’s general 
prohibition on discharges of pollutants into our nation’s navigable 
waterways.  The Oregon Court of Appeals, in describing this statutory 
framework, correctly identified section 402 as the first exception to 
that prohibition.  The court then went on to describe section 404 as 
regulating a “subset of pollutant discharges—discharges of ‘dredged 
or fill material.”  It noted that discharges falling within section 404, 
by the language of section 402, are not subject to the section 402 
permitting scheme. 
While this description may very well be accurate, the court failed, 
in its expository report on the meaning of each section, to point out 
the critical relationship between the two sections.  Not once did the 
court discuss the EPA’s “veto power” under section 404(c) to 
effectively prohibit the Secretary of the Army from permitting a 
proposed discharge if the EPA Administrator finds that the discharge 
would have an “unacceptable adverse effect on [the environment].”  
Had the court considered this, along with the history of the legislation 
and the meaning of the term “discharge,” perhaps its analysis would 
have seemed a little less clouded. 
The EPA’s authority under section 404(c) is necessary in the 
structural framework because it allows the authority of the Corps of 
Engineers to be preserved in section 404 without undermining the 
express purposes of the Act itself: to “[r]estore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of [the] Nation’s 
waters.”117  Beyond that, however, 404(c) also answers the question 
about whether a given discharge of dredged or fill material is 
regulable under both section 402 and section 404.  It is simply not. 
Discharges of such material are presumptively regulable under section 
404 unless the EPA Administrator exercises its veto power under 
section 404(c).  If Congress intended a single discharge to be parsed 
so finely as to allow the EPA and the Corps to regulate different 
components thereof—as the Court of Appeals held in NEDC—then 
section 404(c) would be without meaning.  That is a proposition one 
cannot assume.118 
 
117 Federal Water Pollution Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
118 See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991) 
(declining to adopt an interpretation that would render a portion of a statute “mere 
surplusage” and without effect). 
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D.  NEDC Reconsidered 
The Oregon Court of Appeals should reconsider its reasoning and 
its conclusion in NEDC.  Although the various agency interpretations 
of the Clean Water Act permitting schemes are concededly complex, 
it seems clear that there may in fact be a brighter line between 
sections 402 and 404 than the Oregon court established.  That the 
U.S. Supreme Court recently announced a clear distinction certainly 
bolsters this position.  Although the Oregon Court of Appeals posits 
that its decision is consistent with, and issued pursuant to, the 
Supreme Court’s announcement in Coeur Alaska, the practical effect 
of the ruling is altogether inconsistent with Coeur Alaska and will 
only compound the confusion that already exists. 
On reconsideration, the Oregon Court of Appeals should consider 
the history of the Clean Water Act, the purposes behind the agencies 
that administer the law, and the practical effect of its prior holding.  
All of this, taken together, may lead the court down a more 
straightforward road—or a more readily navigable stream—and allow 
it to see why recreational gold mining does not fall within the 
authority of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals’ decision in NEDC might, on its face, appear 
to be somewhat limited.  The facts are relatively limited to the 
practice of small suction dredge mining, and the EQC’s subsequent 
reissuance of the 700-PM permit might appear, to some, to correct 
whatever flaws might inhere in the opinion.  On further consideration, 
however, one might see that the court’s conclusion regarding the 700-
PM permit’s “lack of specificity” as to “the particular discharge” it 
sought to regulate was in fact irrelevant.  What is important is that the 
opinion fundamentally misreads the language of the Clean Water Act 
by allowing simultaneous regulation of a single discharge by two, 
“mutually exclusive” regulatory schemes.  The Oregon court’s 
opinion is thus inconsistent with the structure of the Act and the 
Supreme Court’s most recent interpretation thereof. 
Oregon courts should reconsider the interpretation of the Clean 
Water Act expounded in NEDC, and in doing so, the courts should 
account for the purposes behind the Act, the precise language of the 
Act in regulating single “discharges,” and the overall structure of the 
complex statutory scheme.  The NEDC opinion ultimately confers 
excessive authority on the state agencies charged with implementing 
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the Act’s permitting schemes, and where that authority is misplaced, 
could undermine its overall environmental protection goals. 
 
 
